Vladimir Putin Is Running Out of Cards
There has been a notable absence from the Iran war, only occasionally rearing his head, and, even then, without much consequence: Vladimir Putin.
It tells a quiet story about the state of Russian relevance under Putin, one that sits in direct contrast to the gloating of some the Kremlin's livelier apparatchiks.
Iran is cementing a truth about Putin's Russia. For all the Kremlin's bluster, it is now a second-order power, one shaped by events more than it shapes them.
The Kremlin sells itself as a decisive pole in a multipolar world, especially among BRICS members like Iran.
But the Iran crisis is a reminder that while Russia remains dangerous, it is increasingly absent when the world's most consequential bargains are actually being made.
Kremlin Taunts Are a Confession
Putin's special envoy Kirill Dmitriev enjoys needling Western allies over tensions with the U.S., with which he is engaged in talks about resetting the Washington-Moscow relationship and resolving Ukraine war.
Dmitriev's social media pages are scattered with mockery and derision aimed at European leaders like Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron.
In a March post on his X account, quoted by TASS, Dmitriev predicted that “Europe and the U.K. will beg for Russian energy resources.” In another post on his X feed, again quoted by TASS, Dmitriev called Starmer and other European leaders “UK & EU warmongers” and “Chaos leaders.”
Dmitry Medvedev, deputy to Putin on Russia's Security Council, has pushed the same line more crudely on his official English-language Telegram feed.
In a February post after JD Vance's Munich speech, Medvedev wrote that Europeans would “resentfully swallow that brutal dressing-down from their senior partner,” and added that today's Europe “is weak, unattractive, and of little use to anyone-except itself.”
In another post on the same feed, he described Europe's economy as “weak and dependent on the US.”
The intent of rhetoric like this is obvious: flatter American unilateralism, belittle London, Paris, and Berlin, and widen every visible crack inside NATO.
But the underlying facts about Russia's own position are uncomfortable.
As The Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center points out: “Most of Moscow's military resources are tied up in Ukraine.” Russia, now an economic basket case, is bogged down in a stalled and deeply costly war from which its society may never truly recover.
Moreover, the EU Institute for Security Studies describes the Russia-China relationship as deeply asymmetrical, with Beijing enjoying far more room to recalibrate than Moscow. Russia is clearly the junior and dependent partner.
Plus, NATO allies can say no to the U.S., as we have seen in Iran, much to President Donald Trump’s irritation. Could Moscow afford to deny Beijing in the same way?
At the same time, the European Commission says EU dependence on Russian gas has fallen from 45 percent of imports at the start of the war to 12 percent in 2025, and the bloc has now adopted a legal phaseout of remaining Russian gas imports, radically reducing Moscow’s most significant leverage over Europe for decades.
In this light, Dmitriev's and Medvedev's Europe-bashing reads like pure projection.
They keep insisting that Britain, France, Germany, and the rest of Europe are weak dependents, even as the record shows that Russia is the power tied down in Ukraine, constrained in its relationship with China, and being written out of Europe's energy future.
The rhetoric is no proof of Kremlin strength. It's a confession of Russian weakness.
Pakistan Got the Call
A revealing feature of the Iran crisis is that Pakistan helped broker the ceasefire and is still preparing the next round of talks.
Russia was not central to the diplomacy here, which is instead running through Islamabad. Moscow wasn't needed, even as its last remaining ally in the Middle East faces an existential question about its future.
The Kremlin is a sidelined power, not an indispensable one. It doesn't wield the trust or authority to play the role of crisis manager. Instead, it is relegated to a position of a bystander with interests, and even then, it hasn't offered Tehran much in the way of tangible support.
When reports emerged of Russia supplying Iranian forces with intelligence that could help them hit American targets, the White House simply shrugged them off: not as false, but as immaterial to the situation on the ground.
Russia's much-advertised strategic partnership treaty with Iran, signed in January 2025, had also stopped well short of a mutual-defense pact, with the obvious implication: neither side was capable of coming to the rescue of the other.
Moscow and Tehran are genuine partners. But their partnership has limits precisely where great-power status is tested: in the willingness and capacity to manage the events outside one's main theater.
Russia’s Profits, American Choices
The strongest case for Russian strength in this crisis is economic, not strategic.
The Council on Foreign Relations argued that Russia emerged as an early beneficiary of the war, and Chatham House goes further, calling it “an economic gift for Putin.”
But the same evidence also weakens the maximalist reading of Kremlin power.
Russia's gains came from higher oil prices after disruption in the Gulf and from the U.S. decision to ease sanctions on Russian oil, not from any Russian ability to broker, deter, or command the conflict.
Before that windfall, Russia's export revenues had fallen sharply, its budget deficit was becoming politically uncomfortable, and Reuters calculations showed the Iran war would double Russia's main oil-tax take in April to about $9 billion.
That is real relief. It is not proof of global primacy. Opportunism is not the same thing as leverage.
A power that profits because Washington changed policy is not the author of events. It is the incidental winner of someone else's gamble.
And that can easily turn in the other direction, whether you want it to or not.
The Harder Limit on Putin
The bigger picture is Moscow's narrowing room for maneuver with China.
The EU Institute for Security Studies describes a “pronounced dependency gap” that gives Beijing “asymmetric strategic flexibility.”
China can recalibrate if the costs rise. Russia, by contrast, has far less leverage because it is more dependent on Chinese goods and markets, especially given how reliant it is now on exporting sanctioned oil to Beijing to fund its war in Ukraine.
This is a cleaner way to understand the current hierarchy than the old lazy shorthand about an anti-Western axis.
Russia is not China’s peer in this relationship: It is the more constrained partner.
This will likely become apparent during Trump's postponed trip to China, rescheduled for May 14-15. Beijing’s geopolitical priority is for stable relations with the U.S., its rival great power.
The strategic Russia partnership, while deeply important to Beijing, is ultimately secondary to managing its relationship with the U.S., which relates more directly to its biggest priorities, including Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific, and global trade and investment.
A Russia whose most important external relationship is defined by Chinese discretion is not sitting near the top of the global order. It is operating beneath someone else’s ceiling.
Putin Still Has Spoiler Cards
But Putin is not out of cards to play, even if none are system-shaping ones.
Russia can still escalate hybrid pressure on NATO allies through cyber activity, political interference, economic coercion, and threatening rhetoric, such as leaning more explicitly into nuclear threats to increase pressure.
It can try to press harder in Ukraine while a new offensive is underway and diplomacy there is stalled, perhaps by more frequently using its newer hypersonic weapons, such as the Oreshnik.
Moscow may also deepen covert support to Tehran as long as the war drags on, increasing the costs on Washington of the action, though it would risk losing any progress it has made on Ukraine and sanctions with the Trump administration.
Those are serious threats. But they are also the tactics of a spoiler, not the conduct of a state able to set the diplomatic agenda or force the kind of changes it wants to see through overwhelming economic or military power.
The Clarification of Iran
The Iran crisis has therefore clarified something the Kremlin has spent years trying to obscure. Russia can still disrupt, profit, intimidate, and prolong. What it increasingly cannot do is compel.
The truth about a state whose army is tied down in Ukraine, whose windfalls depend on oil shocks and U.S. sanctions choices, whose most important external relationship is asymmetrical in China's favor, and whose old European energy position is being written out of law, is becoming more legible.
Putin still holds cards. But they are the cards of a power with a weak hand that relies on bluffing rather than anything that can dictate the game.
Hey gang, Carlo Versano here. I hope you enjoyed this article. As Newsweek‘s Director of Politics and Culture and editor of the 1600 newsletter, I’m keen to hear what you think. Now, Newsweek is offering a new service to allow you to communicate directly with me in the form of a text message chat. You can sign up and get a direct line to me, as well as the reporters who work for me. You can shape our coverage.
As a Newsweek member, we’re offering this service to you for free. You can sign up below, or read more about how it works here. Let’s talk!
2026 NEWSWEEK DIGITAL LLC.
This story was originally published April 21, 2026 at 6:21 AM.