He offered a lawmaker's aide quick cash. Was he spying for China?

WASHINGTON -- When a man identifying himself as Chris Chen reached out this winter to an aide on a House committee focused on threats from China, he came armed with a lucrative offer.

The staff member, Chen proposed, could earn $10,000 or more by barely lifting a finger. All he would need to do is agree to phone calls every other week to share information about the committee’s work and U.S. foreign policy on China.

Insights into U.S. trade or national-security issues, including the Trump administration’s plans for Venezuela in the aftermath of the January military operation there, would be especially valuable, Chen said. To sweeten the pot, Chen repeatedly promised to send the aide $2,000 up front.

The offer seemed too good to be true. Instead of quietly accepting the deal, the aide, whose identity The New York Times agreed to withhold because he works on sensitive policy issues related to China, reported it to his bosses on the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. The panel quickly concluded Chen was not the Singapore-based business consultant he claimed to be, but instead likely a Chinese intelligence officer or contractor seeking a new recruit.

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An Offer of $10,000 for Information

By framing the initial offer as a “trial period,” Chen dangled the expectation of a longer relationship with more payments to come, a common recruitment hook for spies.

“I would like to propose … three-month trial period lasting until the end of March. … And I will provide a total compensation of $10,000 for the three-month trial period.”

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Rather than cut off contact, the committee’s Republican majority staff agreed to keep talking to Chen. They recorded a series of calls this winter to learn more about his tactics and interests.

Transcripts of those calls, which the committee shared with the Times alongside some of the recorded audio, depict a determined, at times impatient, individual eager to earn the trust of his mark and get down to business. Chen mixes holiday greetings with elaborate questions about manufacturing in Vietnam and Mexico and the future of Venezuela’s oil industry.

Beijing and Washington have been aggressively spying on each other for decades, an inevitable byproduct of what are now the world’s two largest economies competing across the globe. But by their nature, those shadow games rarely surface such a detailed look at how either side plies its trade.

The outreach by Chen to an aide on the very committee responsible for investigating Chinese national-security threats appears to provide an unusually vivid portrait of how Beijing’s spy services seek to gain access to sensitive information from within the corridors of power in Washington.

By some measures, the spying on both sides has intensified in recent months, as the bilateral relationship -- which will be tested this week during a summit in Beijing between President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping -- has grown more strained.

Chinese hackers are believed by U.S. investigators to have at least twice compromised internal networks at the FBI related to its sensitive surveillance activities. The CIA has published videos on social media in Mandarin openly seeking to recruit spies from China’s military that have led to new assets being developed in the country, according to U.S. intelligence officials.

After about two months of conversations with Chen, the House committee referred the matter to the FBI, which declined to comment when asked if it had opened an investigation, but it has been tracking increasingly brazen intelligence-gathering operations by China. It said only that “China and other foreign governments are using professional networking social media sites to target people with U.S. government security clearances.”

Seeking to cultivate a source in the heart of a congressional committee dedicated to addressing the threat from China would be an especially audacious move.

Chen first contacted the staff member in December from a Gmail account with a display name of Kris Chen, though he signed his emails with the spelling Chris. He described himself as an employee of NimbusHub Strategic Consulting, a Hong Kong-based firm with a spartan website that promises “to provide clients with the tools and knowledge necessary to navigate an increasingly complex global landscape.” The website contains filler text in Latin, which often auto-populates unfinished sections of websites.

Other clues point to NimbusHub as a front for China’s spy services. In a February report on malicious uses of its artificial-intelligence tools, OpenAI identified ChatGPT users who had used the model to generate email drafts purporting to be from employees of NimbusHub. The emails addressed to state officials in the United States and policy analysts working in business and finance came from personas who, like Chen, sought to offer paid consulting gigs for information.

The small number of users, whom OpenAI later banned, told ChatGPT to flatter their targets and sent their prompts in simplified Chinese characters, the standard writing system in mainland China, rather than traditional Chinese characters, which Hong Kong continues to use.

“They requested the email drafts to be concise, clear, and professional, with subject lines that created urgency and used subtle psychological cues,” the OpenAI report said.

NimbusHub did not respond to emailed requests for comment, nor did Chen on the Gmail account or phone number he used to contact the congressional aide. The profile picture for Chen’s WhatsApp number depicts a Winnie-the-Pooh doll wearing large headphones, an apparent mocking reference to Xi. Winnie-the-Pooh imagery has for years been a target of censorship in China and a symbol of resistance, which would fit with a persona of a Hong Kong businessperson at a remove from mainland China.

There was no sign of NimbusHub at the Hong Kong address listed on the firm’s website when a Times reporter visited Tuesday. An office directory displayed near the elevator banks of the 24-story tower, Tai Yau Building, in the heart of the city’s Wan Chai district, listed 94 other tenants. Two women stationed at a concierge booth in the beige-tiled lobby said they had never heard of NimbusHub.

Liu Pengyu, a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, said in a statement that “the so-called false narrative regarding China engaging in espionage activities is entirely devoid of factual basis or evidence.”

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Interest in U.S. Plans for Venezuela

Days after the U.S. military in January captured the Venezuelan president, Nicolás Maduro, in a nighttime raid in Caracas, Chen asked for insights into U.S. plans for Venezuela.

“Maybe next time we can discuss Venezuela, like how it ties into the U.S. reshaping supply chains, such as the oil supply chain, and the key minerals and the manufacturing supply chain.”

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The introductory email from Chen on Dec. 17 was full of business jargon, and presented the chance to share information as a way to offer “expert consultation and viewpoint exchange, including real-time policy and news interpretation and forward-looking strategic insights.”

After notifying his colleagues on the committee, the congressional aide responded and conveyed an interest in expanding his “advisory work outside my primary duties.” From then on, Chen appeared hooked. In follow-up emails and on phone calls, he expressed a willingness to be flexible with the work arrangement while making clear he was eager to start paying.

“I can pay you $2,000 -- $2,000 advance payment,” Chen said during a call in January. “As soon as possible in the next few days, just to make sure our operation is getting started.”

Chen at times seemed most curious to learn what those close to power in the United States thought about China’s stated intentions, such as a commitment to purchase U.S. soybeans or whether China would relax control over rare-earth minerals. “So if China turns the controls back next year, do you guys have a plan B?” he asked.

The committee has been targeted by Chinese intelligence operations before. Last year, the panel disclosed that an apparent impostor was posing as its chair, Rep. John Moolenaar, R-Mich., and sending emails to government agencies and other institutions seeking information about potential sanctions against Beijing. Cybersecurity investigators linked the emails to a hacking group with ties to the Ministry of State Security, a central spy agency for China.

“The Chinese government actively targets Congress and congressional staff as part of a broader influence and intelligence collection effort, frequently using benign-appearing inquiries to get sensitive information,” Moolenaar said in a statement.

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Access to the Boss

Chen does little to hide his interest in mapping the House aide’s proximity to powerful figures in Washington.

Chen: So the congressman is the person in the committee, right?

Aide: Yes, he’s the boss. He’s the top boss.Chen: If he’s the boss, you work for the chairman, right?

Aide: Correct.Chen: Wow. Wow.

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Dakota Cary, an expert on Chinese espionage, said that “legislative-branch intelligence targeting” has long been a priority for Beijing’s spy services and its vast array of contractors. He said that was in part because lawmakers and their aides -- many of whom are young and earn relatively paltry salaries in Washington -- can be privy to sensitive information while being seen as potentially easy scores. China has also been accused of targeting lawmakers in other countries, including Britain and Canada.

“Xi Jinping has prioritized a style of diplomacy which vociferously defends the country” and the Communist Party, Cary said. Among other benefits, knowing the House committee’s investigatory work and legislative proposals would allow China to prepare propaganda to counter those efforts, he said. Trump’s summit with Xi this week is expected to focus on a trade deal and a number of security issues, including Taiwan.

China has a long record of targeting U.S. politicians and federal workers for espionage, including the theft of government personnel files on more than 20 million people a decade ago. Last year, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based think tank, and Reuters found evidence that a network of fake consulting firms controlled by a Chinese technology firm was targeting former government employees who had lost their jobs at the start of the second Trump administration.

Recruiting an aide on the House China Committee is not likely to be as valuable as turning an intelligence official with access to classified material about U.S. nuclear weapons programs, bespoke hacking tools or espionage assets in China, experts said. But the panel is still a high-value target. The congressional aide cut off contact with Chen in late February before being paid, citing an internal ethics determination. Chen lamented the development, but emailed again days later to say he believed they could get around the conflict.

“If you are still interested in exploring a collaboration, I would welcome the chance to walk you through this alternative path during a brief call,” Chen said. “Please let me know if this is of interest to you.”

The aide never responded.

This article originally appeared in The New York Times.

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