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The Department of Energy will investigate safety concerns raised by a former senior executive who believes he lost his job at the vitrification plant because of them.
In addition to the probe by DOE's Office of Health, Safety and Security, Ines Triay, DOE assistant secretary for environmental management, has requested that DOE's Office of Inspector General investigate the allegation of retaliation. She also requested the safety investigation.
"In order to effectively complete the safe cleanup of the Cold War legacy sites, our workers must have confidence that concerns can be raised without retribution," she said in a statement. "We will carefully review any complaint that actions have been taken against an employee as a result of raising safety concerns."
Both investigations are to be independent of the DOE Office of Environmental Management, which oversees work at the vitrification plant and is led by Triay.
At the center of the issue is Walter Tamosaitis, a former research and technology manager at the $12.3 billion vitrification plant being built to turn Hanford's high-level radioactive tank waste into a stable glass form for disposal.
He was dismissed and escorted from the building without notice July 2, a day after he discussed a list of 50 potential safety and technical issues related to future operations of the plant at a project meeting, he said.
His dismissal was "a punitive and retaliatory action," that may cause other employees to keep quiet about safety issues, he said.
However, Bechtel National, the DOE contractor for the vit plant, disagreed, saying its nuclear safety and quality culture encourages all employees to have a questioning attitude.
Tamosaitis, who worked for Bechtel's primary subcontractor URS, left the project because URS work to address certain technical issues had ended, according to URS.
Tamosaitis subsequently outlined his concerns in a letter to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, which was established by Congress to provide independent oversight of the nation's nuclear weapons complex.
It responded by launching an investigation of his safety concerns, although it does not have authority to investigate allegations of retaliation.
DOE will cooperate fully with the safety board's investigation, Triay said.
"The Department of Energy is committed to taking any actions needed to ensure the proper nuclear safety culture is fostered at each of our sites," she said.
The DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security investigation will include reviewing the processes in place to collect, track, evaluate and correct nuclear design and engineering safety concerns and issues for the vitrification plant, according to the DOE office.
The review also will examine the work environment to determine whether it encourages the reporting of nuclear safety issues by workers, engineers, supervisors, managers and other employees, according to the DOE office.
The same DOE agency also took a comprehensive look this spring at Hanford practices to protect workers from beryllium contamination.
For the vit plant investigation, the safety board sent letters to DOE, Bechtel and URS saying that all records or files related to the matter should be preserved, including all working papers and other documents saved on Tamosaitis' computer.
Triay also sent letters to federal staff and contractors instructing them to preserve relevant information.
The DOE Office of Health, Safety and Security expects its investigative field work to be completed in September.
Bechtel said it is addressing the 50 issues identified by Tamosaitis' work group. A year earlier, his work group had compiled a list of about 100 technical and safety issues, and some of the 50 issues in the current list were closely related. Before the July 1 meeting at which the 50 issues were discussed, managers had been asked to compile any outstanding issues.
-- Annette Cary: 582-1533; acary@tricityherald.com;
